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Introduction
As the title implies, it used to be legal to plant soybeans in the Brazilian Amazon, as
long as national environmental laws governing deforestation were followed. Given
fairly low land prices in this relatively remote area of Brazil, and the world market’s
insatiable appetite for protein, among other reasons we detail below, soybeans have
found a comfortable home in what has become one of the world’s newest “bread -
baskets” (Economist, 2010). The increased environmental and social costs of such
rapid expansion, however, led international environmental nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) to take action against it (Howden, 2006). As a result, in 2006, the
landscape of Amazon soybean production changed dramatically. 
A so-called “soy moratorium” was declared, making it “illegal” to purchase any
soybeans grown on deforested land in the Amazon biome after July of 2006 (ABIOVE
(Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries), 2006). This declaration was not
made by any court of law, not by any presidential decree. Rather, large agribusiness
firms in Brazil, with substantial global corporate and non-governmental environ-
mental organization support, declared the moratorium. With it, they pledged to
govern themselves, but in effect, the moratorium made illegal what used to be perfectly
legal. There was a dramatic effect on what farmers could plant, where they could plant
it, and arguably the moratorium has contributed to lower deforestation rates in the
Amazon. The moratorium was not merely another “new law.” Its efficacy relied on a
geographic information gathering and enforcement system that appears to be an
example of neoliberal environmental governance that works, the kind of international
market-based conservation opportunity cheered by some as leading to the end of
deforestation in the Amazon basin (Nepstad, Soares et al., 2009).
The soy moratorium occurs in the midst of a lively debate in the environmentalist
community about how best to conserve forests and other sensitive areas. On one hand,
is the emerging group that is calling for more market-led solutions, such as the soy
moratorium. On the other hand, are the groups that support a more traditional, state-
led approach, centering on the creation and enforcement of protected areas and
supplemented with state-led incentive programs that would dissuade people from
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moving to and clearing areas of forest. In the Amazon, these two contrasting views are
well represented by the writings of Daniel Nepstad and Philip Fearnside, respectively.
Both have the same ultimate goal — stopping deforestation — but they have come to
endorse somewhat different strategies for achieving it.
Fearnside has long been an advocate of an approach that mixes a variety of state-
led strategies:
Removing the motives for deforestation will require a stop to regularizing land claims,
as well as cutting the various subsidies through which Brazilian taxpayers still
contribute to the profitability of clearing. Controlling deforestation requires estab-
lishment of the rule of law throughout Amazonia, including a complete cadaster, or
register, of land titles and reinforcement of command-and-control programs.
Movement to the frontier must be discouraged by exercising restraint in approving
infrastructure projects, especially for highways, and by creating and protecting
conservation units. At the same time, economic alternatives must be created by gener-
ating employment in source areas and in alternative destinations, by supporting
sustainable uses of the forest and alternative supply of national markets for products
such as wood. Most fundamental is continued progress in creating mechanisms to
reward the environmental services of standing forest as an alternative foundation for
the economy in rural Amazonia. (Fearnside, 2008: 16)
In contrast, Nepstad trumpets the power of globalized markets to create oppor -
tunities for conservation: 
Brazil has two major opportunities to end the clearing of its Amazon forest and to
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions substantially. The first is its formal announce-
ment within United Nations climate treaty negotiations in 2008 of an Amazon
deforestation reduction target, which prompted Norway to commit $1 billion if it
sustains progress toward this target. The second is a widespread marketplace transi-
tion within the beef and soy industries, the main drivers of deforestation, to exclude
Amazon deforesters from their supply chains. (Nepstad, Soares et al., 2009: 1350)
As is evident in these two quotations, where Fearnside sees largely state-led
 solutions to the problem of Amazonian deforestation, Nepstad sees market-led solu-
tions. Even more broadly, Fearnside looks to internal (domestic) forces, while Nepstad
looks to external (international) ones. The key differences between these two
approaches are the enforcement mechanisms. Fearnside’s approach recognizes the
fundamental role of the state in the enforcement of forest policy, executable via fines
and related command and control mechanisms. Alternatively, the state can orches-
trate incentives in the forms of tax breaks, jobs programs, and the like. Nepstad, in
contrast, sees the market as the most practical and effective enforcement mechanism.
The logic is as straightforward as state enforcement via protected areas — if farmers
cannot sell their products, then they will not undertake efforts to clear forests for farm-
land. The strategy exemplified by Fearnside’s quote represents the status quo for
many countries, including Brazil. The strategies endorsed by Nepstad, and identified
as “major opportunities to end the clearing of [the] Amazon forest,” are newer. 
This chapter aims to add a level of richness to our understanding of current efforts
to stop deforestation as being either state-led, or market-led. We consider the history
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of how trading soy came to be “illegal” in the eyes of the market and how market-led
strategies have been able to achieve a level of enforcement that the state was never
willing or able to accomplish. This history makes it clear that the soy moratorium could
not be the market-led success it is if it were not first for the establishment of a very
strong state-led effort, beginning over half a century earlier, to map and monitor the
resources of the Amazon. Such efforts date back to the 1930 military-backed installa-
tion of Getúlio Vargas to the Brazilian presidency and the eventual establishment of
the Estado Novo, during which Vargas built strong national state institutions and infor-
mation gathering systems for the very first time. These institutions were essential in
building the knowledge base, and the technology to develop, the resources of the
Amazon in order to build the new national state. Subsequent military dictatorships
during the Cold War further consolidated this trend. By the time democracy and
global market forces were in full play at the start of the twenty-first century, hybrid
state-market policies finally made it possible to render certain activities “illegal,”
backed by enforcement powers that no purely state-led or purely market-led strategy
could muster alone. 
This chapter views the history of the making of illegal soy as going through three
main periods, roughly following Brown and Purcell’s (2005) analysis of the changing
scales of control over decision-making in Amazonian development. The main differ-
ence in the writing of this history is that we are focused on how the making of national
state territory played an essential role in building the institutions and knowledge
required to make new laws and enforce them. This chapter retells this history, albeit
briefly and necessarily glossing over much detail, in order to provide some essential
context for the soy moratorium as a governance strategy. It is also important to estab-
lish the view taken in this chapter that laws, in and of themselves, have territorial
properties — some action is allowed here, but not there — and thus they are an impor-
tant expression of human territoriality (Sack 1986). Thus, our understanding is that
new territories can lead to new laws and vice versa, and in fact the establishment of law
and territory go hand in hand and cannot easily be separated. In short, the establish-
ment of any territory requires some knowledge of what is to be delimited into a territory
along with some justification. Enforcing territorial limits, in turn, requires further infor-
mation and surveillance, which can aid in an even greater detailed delimitation of
territory. Within each period of the making of illegal soy, this chapter focuses on what
political economic interests were in control of the Amazon, the institutions and laws
that governed land use, and the information required for the enforcement of the law.
President Getúlio Vargas, the Military, and the Making of National
State Territory (1930–1964)
Getúlio Vargas came into Brazil’s presidency, installed by military force, after a long
period of extremely decentralized government known as the Old Republic
(1890–1930). During this prior period, regional elites in the most economically
vibrant region of Brazil (coffee barons in the southeast) dominated national-level poli-
tics, setting policies regarding trade and taxes that benefitted themselves, regardless
of the needs of other regions and economies (Weinstein, 1983; Prado Júnior, 1987).
This extreme regionalism, also known as “the politics of the states,” allowed regional
elites elsewhere, such as rubber barons in the Amazon, to control their own  governance
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and the benefits of their own trade, without interference from the national polity
(Burns, 1993: 266). Vargas’s rise to power is most-often understood as a reaction to
this extreme decentralized political system. Once coffee barons in the southeast began
to lose their economic power, due to depressed coffee markets, other emerging inter-
ests in Brazil saw an opening to gain power under the belief that the regional interests
were too selfish (Weinstein, 1983). Backed by industrialists, growing middle and intel-
lectual classes, and idealistic military officers, Vargas rose to power in 1930 with a
project to build an authoritarian nationalist state based on the full incorporation of
national state territory, people and resources, for the good of Brazil (Wirth, 1970; Bak
1983; Bak, 1985). This national project involved dismissal of regional and municipal
legislative bodies, the development of national-level policies and the formation of
national political parties. The year 1937 marked the strongest-ever nationalist and
authoritarian nature of Vargas’s project when he cancelled presidential elections and
dismissed congress, declaring his establishment of a new government called the Estado
Novo (Skidmore and Smith, 2001). 
With respect to the Amazon, Vargas specifically called for Brazilian national civi-
lization to spread westward into the region as part of an effort to bring the full Brazilian
territory into the political and economic life of the nation. This “March to the West,”
was built on the view that Amazonia was an unpopulated, vast region with the poten-
tial for agricultural and natural resource development (Hecht and Cockburn, 1990).
The view resonated strongly with military concerns that neighboring countries and
communist insurgencies could wrest control of the region from national control
(Vargas, 1938–1941; Silva, 1967). In short, Vargas’s project, regarding the Amazon,
was to populate it, control it, and harness it as part of building a strong national state.
Vargas came in and out of power through this period until committing suicide in 1954.
The military, deeply involved in Brazilian politics throughout the period, continued
to build on many of the nationalist efforts Vargas originally put in place.
Vargas and the Brazilian military set the stage for a strong national state beginning
in the 1930s with key institutions and laws that were consistent with Vargas’s project.
In 1931, Brazil’s forest code was enacted as part of a suite of codes that also regulated
scientific expeditions, water use, mines, and hunting and fishing (Dean, 1995). In the
code, Vargas’s “denial of liberalism” and his effort to build Brazil “under the banner
of a modernizing and technocratic nationalism,” is clear (Dean, 1995: 261). The code
abolishes the absolute right of property, and it set rules regarding tree cutting. Trees
must be preserved along waterways to protect watersheds, and when they house rare
species. Land owners could not cut more than three-quarters of forested land. In this
first iteration, the forest code applied to all of Brazil, for the Amazon had yet to be
officially distinguished in Brazilian law (Browder and Godfrey, 1997: 256). This soon
began to change as the Brazilian military and other national institutions increasingly
took an interest in the region, recognizing its potential importance for national defense
and economic development. In 1946, the newly ratified constitution called for a
comprehensive long-term plan for the integration and development of the Amazon.
In 1953, the Superintendency for the Economic Valorization of the Amazon (SPVEA
or Superintendência do Plano de Valorização Econômica da Amazônia) was established
to develop and carry out such a plan (Hecht and Cockburn, 1990). One of the
Superintendency’s first acts was to legally define the Amazon region (the Legal
Amazon or Amazônia Legal) as a form of bio-administrative region. The boundary
included the states of Mato Grosso, Goiás, and western portions of Maranhão, thus
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humid tropical forest and significant areas of savanna, or cerrado, were part of the
same territory (Figure 8.1) (Hecht and Cockburn, 1990; SUDAM, 2011).
One of the key institutions for all these developments during the Vargas years was
The Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute (IBGE or Instituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estatística), which was a 1938, Estado Novo renaming of an earlier national
statistics institute that Vargas had established soon after taking power in 1930
(Almeida, 2003). Most pertinent to our discussion is the Institute’s purpose to amass
knowledge and statistics about Brazil’s socio-economy and its natural resources for
the purposes of providing the information needed for state-led development. It was
the Institute’s business to help organize the nation’s territory, from the national to the
local level, and to map the extent of Brazilian territory to aid in government plans to
incorporate greater and greater amounts of Brazilian space into the national project.
According to Eli Penha (1993), the Institute was an essential part of the government’s
centralized knowledge gathering activities that helped organize Brazilian territory for
nation-building, national policies, and to take the immensity of Brazilian territory and
break it up into political-geographic-administrative units. Roberto Almeida (1994)
emphasizes the involvement of the IBGE in providing the information needed for the
development of major state enterprises under the discourse of national security: from
the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (major mining firm) in 1942 to Petrobrás (Brazil’s
National Petroleum Company) in 1952, none of it could have taken place without
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the mechanisms for territorial control that the IBGE helped put in place. This
included systematic knowledge of the physical aspects of the surface and subsurface,
infrastructure (existing and planned), defining Brazil’s regions, socio-economic
understanding of those regions, and mapping. 
Military Dictatorship, Development, and the Decade of Destruction
(1964–1984)
After Vargas’s death in 1954, the military remained deeply involved in Brazilian poli-
tics until a coup in 1964 when it took definitive control of the country, opened Brazil’s
borders to greater international investment, and established a development strategy
based on rapid industrialization and greater incorporation of the Amazon into the
nation’s political and economic life (Stepan, 1977). Some of the main steps to achieve
this included the funneling of additional capital to the region; a new forest code was
established, and a National Integration Project (PIN or Projeto de Integração Nacional)
initiated a massive effort to survey the region and its resources and to populate it.
These efforts helped further set the territorial limits of investment geared toward
Amazonian development, and out of the hands of insurgents who would disrupt the
national project. In the process, however, the efforts also began to define the converse
of development, which was the requirement that landholders set aside a certain portion
of their land for the purpose of conservation.
Based on the Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute’s identification of Brazil’s
regions, the military established new regional development “superintendencies” to
funnel capital specifically to each region. The Amazon’s unit, formed in 1966, was
called the Superintendency of Amazonian Development (SUDAM or Super -
intendência Desenvolvimento da Amazônia). Soon after taking power, the military
established a new forest code. The Forest Code first put into place by the Vargas
Administration had gone largely unenforced (Dean, 1995). The new code was
enacted in 1965, and its most important innovation was a differential restriction on
deforestation, based on whether land is in or outside of a particular area of the country,
presumably where humid tropical forests predominate. Recall that the Legal Amazon
was first created in 1953, but the 1965 code does not name it specifically. Rather, the
key article pertaining to deforestation and conservation, Article 44, states that in the
“North region and the northern part of the Center-West region,” only up to 50 percent
of the tree cover could be removed from a property:
Art. 44. Na região Norte e na parte Norte da região Centro-Oeste enquanto não for
estabelecido o decreto de que trata o artigo 15, a exploração a corte razo só é permis-
sível desde que permaneça com cobertura arbórea, pelo menos 50% da área de cada
propriedade. (Lei n° 4771, de 15 de setembro de 1965)
Though ostensibly responding to increasing demands for forest conservation, an
underlying purpose of the 1965 Forest Code was to exert oversight and control over
large landowners, who were seen by the military as potentially problematic due to their
opposition to certain agrarian reforms (Dean, 1995). The Forest Code as written in
1965, though subsequently modified, remains the basic template for forest governance
in Brazil up to the present (2011).
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With the boundaries of Brazil’s Amazon region taking shape administratively and
with respect to the new forest code, the military simultaneously initiated an aerial
survey of the vast territory of the Amazon, mapping relief, vegetation, geology, soils,
and mineral deposits, echoing Vargas’s concerns about knowledge of and control over
the Amazon as questions of national security. The roots of this effort go to an agency
called the National Commission of Space Activities (CNAE or Comissão Nacional de
Atividades Espaciais), founded in 1963 (INPE, 2011). It was then that Commission
personnel travelled to NASA for training in the use of side-looking airborne radar
(SLAR) aboard an airplane to create a 1:1.000,000 survey of the nation’s natural
resources (Oliveira, 1999). This link between NASA and the Commission to survey
the resources of such a huge land mass potentially signals that not only was it a project
for Brazil’s military government to build its version of the national state, but it also
served the US’s hemispheric interest in ensuring this vast region did not become a
communist stronghold during the Cold War. Surveillance of the Amazon on an annual
basis also became possible with new satellite remote sensing technologies. In 1972,
NASA launched the first of its Landsat program satellites that transmitted imagery
back to earth, allowing for the tracking of Amazon deforestation from year-to-year.
One year earlier, the military dissolved the old National Commission of Space
Activities and formed the present day National Institute of Space Research (INPE or
Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais), a key institution that has over the years
produced official deforestation statistics and maps from interpretation of satellite
imagery, primarily from NASA satellites that were first launched in the early 1970s. 
This Radar Amazonia project (RADAM or Radar na Amazônia) became oper -
ational in 1970 as part of the larger National Integration Project (PIN) (Foresta,
1991). The project was funded heavily by international capital, and it was followed
by a series of development programs funded in part by investments from the World
Bank. The project, and the numerous others that followed, allowed for the construc-
tion of new major highways, and improvements to older ones, vastly improving
connections between the Amazon and the rest of Brazil. They also allowed for colo-
nization of the region by Brazil’s poor, which were, until then, largely concentrated in
Brazil’s south, southeast, and northeast. Tens of thousands of families moved into the
Amazon to take part in the private and state-led colonization projects along the new
highways beginning in the 1970s. PIN and numerous regional subprojects in later
years succeeded in infrastructure improvements and the settling of a whole new gener-
ation of Brazilians on the Amazon frontier, helping lead to an Amazon region today
that is mostly urban (Browder and Godfrey, 1997). They failed, however, in miti-
gating the social and environmental costs of this mass movement of people. The
so-called “Decade of Destruction” ensued across the Amazon, and by the early 1980s,
the Brazilian government and its financiers were accused by Brazilian citizens and
international environmental organizations alike, of a number of transgressions
including: failing to protect indigenous populations from encroachment by settlers,
high deforestation rates, poor delivery of government services to settler populations,
and high rates of rural violence associated with contested land tenure on the frontier
(Cowell, 1990; Millikan, 1992; Rich, 1994). 
In sum, this period was marked by a very intense focus on the Amazon as a major
component of a national development strategy, requiring vast amounts of informa-
tion, vast investments in infrastructure, mass movement of people, and subsequent
impacts on people and the environment. Brazil’s national, state-led project, though
116 | J. Christopher Brown and Matthew Koeppe
Cooper and Hunefeldt - Amazonia - final - Phoenix  03/11/2012  16:21  Page 116
dependent on a huge influx of international and private capital, was about to be chal-
lenged by its own people, as the country entered a period of democratization, and by
international environmental and human rights groups. 
Democracy, Market-led Conservation, and the Soy Moratorium
(1985–present)
With democratization spreading in Brazil and around the world in the 1980s and early
1990s, the world entered an era recognized for the so-called weakening of state insti-
tutions. Neo-liberalism began to take hold as a dominant economic discourse and
practice that shaped state-society relations and had its own impacts on, and oppor -
tunities for, environmental conservation (Nepstad, McGrath et al., 2002; Nepstad,
Stickler et al., 2006; Brannstrom, 2009). The year 1985 marked an important tran -
sition in Brazil, with the presidency of José Sarney, the first civilian president since
1964. He came into office in the middle of the “Decade of Destruction,” when world
attention on the human suffering and massive deforestation occurring in the Amazon
reached its highest level. The push to develop the Amazon in a state-led, military
fashion came under attack, often fueled by case studies of abuses and also by the new
satellite images from space showing deforestation. (The imagery was interpreted,
analyzed, and reported annually by Brazil’s own National Space Research Institute,
which tracked deforestation across the entire Legal Amazon (Câmara, Valeriano et
al., 2006)). International human rights and environmental NGOs exerted tremendous
pressure on Brazil and the main financiers of its development (multi-lateral institu-
tions like the World Bank) to change business-as-usual development practice. This
pressure is exemplified well in the international NGO campaign against the World
Bank and the Brazilian government for their controversial agricultural development
projects in the state of Rondonia (Brown, 2001). As a result of this pressure, the World
Bank redesigned the approval process for its loans for development in sensitive areas
like the Amazon, and governments had to become more sensitive to citizen concerns
about protecting human rights and the environment in development. 
The Forest Code underwent minor revisions in 1989, but the rule requiring the
maintenance of 50 percent of forest cover on landholdings remained in force at
the time. In 2001, under increasing pressure from the environmentalist com -
munity, the Brazilian government made significant changes to the details of the Code
through presidential decree, or what is known as a medida provisória. The Forest Code
is now referred to informally as the “Medida Provisória,” or simply “2166,” the
number of the decree. The important changes to the law decreed in the Medida
Provisória include: the definition of “areas for permanent preservation” (APP or Área
de Preservação Permanente), the formal definition of “legal reserve” (which had been
included in the 1989 revision), and most importantly, changes to the legal limits of
deforestation on private properties in the Legal Amazon. The “APP” is defined as
areas that can never be deforested, with very few exceptions, in order to preserve
features such as hydrological resources, geological stability, and critical habitats,
among others. The “legal reserve” is defined as the percentage of the property that
must be maintained under forest cover, not including any APP. The Medida Provisória
changed the percentages of properties that must be maintained in legal reserve to 80
percent in areas of humid forest, and 35 percent in areas of cerrado, or savanna. On
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properties that contain both humid forest and savanna vegetation, the percentages of
legal reserve are to be assigned proportionally. The legal reserve is just 20 percent in
the rest of the country. These new percentages are laid out in the Forest Code’s revised
article 16 (Medida Provisória° 2166–67, de 24 de agosto de 2001). 
These changes in the forest code are extremely important; the code went beyond
being specific to the Legal Amazon (one with easily identified boundaries). It set the
rules for the percentage of native vegetation required to be maintained in legal reserve
according to what type of vegetation existed on landholdings, savanna vs. humid forest
within the Legal Amazon, a distinction that is not always easy to define, as discussed
below. By setting the limit on deforestation to 20 percent of landholdings in humid
forest, and up to 65 percent removal of vegetation in areas of savanna, the code ex -
plicitly put a greater conservation value on humid forest than savanna, in effect
codifying the notion of the savanna as a “sacrifice zone” in Brazil’s attempts to develop
its vast Amazonian interior (Brannstrom, 2009). 
Deforestation for the purposes of agricultural and pasture development continued
apace during the 1990s and 2000s, closely tracked by INPE (Câmara, Valeriano et
al., 2006). Through this period, the Brazilian government showed itself incapable or
unwilling to halt deforestation in command and control fashion, despite the wealth of
geographically precise information it had at its disposal to locate offenders of Brazil’s
forest code, and in spite of some well publicized efforts now and then at the state and
federal level to crack down (Fearnside, 2003). Consistent with neo-liberal discourse
and practice, there were more and more calls for market-led conservation efforts. This
can be seen in arguments for “productive conservation,” in which there is a push to
increase market demand for products that require the maintenance of forest cover (so-
called non-timber forest products), which experienced varying degrees of success and
problems (Anderson, 1990; Browder, 1990; Hall, 1997; Brown, 2001). 
In spite of these efforts, deforestation continued unabated, linked heavily to
increasing market demand for beef, other livestock, and soybeans, produced within
the Legal Amazon. By the mid to late-1990s, the state of Mato Grosso had become
the center for the cultivation of soybeans on large landholdings and with some of the
most modern agricultural technology available in the world (Carvalho, 1999;
Fearnside, 2001). Used commonly in vegetable oil, as feed for chickens and hogs, and
exported to Europe and China, soy had a major role in building economic and polit-
ical power in a region that not long before was a backwater. This is best exemplified
by the rise of the largest soybean producer in the world, Blairo Maggi, who eventu-
ally became the governor of the state of Mato Grosso, and who arguably helped deliver
agri-business support for the re-election of President Lula for his second term in 2006
(Economist, 2006).
While researchers in Brazil sounded the warning that market-demand for
Amazonian soy was now causing deforestation, the international non-governmental
organization, Greenpeace, was preparing its case that the same market could be used
to stop deforestation, if global consumers only knew the true environmental and
human costs of soy production in the Amazon. Greenpeace made the case through
two important actions. One was the release of a document entitled, “Eating the
Amazon,” in April of 2006, which made the detailed case of the manner in which
the international consumption of chicken, hogs, and soy was linked to deforestation
in the Amazon. The other action was much more direct, in classic Greenpeace style.
In May of 2006 at the soybean port of Santarém, Pará on the Amazon River, activists
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arrived in the ship, “Arctic Sunrise,” unfurled spectacular banners, and temporarily
blockaded the port. Greenpeace targeted the port for the action because it believed
the port, financed and built by the American company, Cargill, was illegal
(Greenpeace International, 2006). Some violent altercations ensued between port
facility employees and the protestors, all helping the action attract international news
interest (Howden, 2006). These actions were successful in getting major soy
purchasers and processors, Brazil’s vegetable oil industry association, ABIOVE
(Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Óleos Vegetais) and Brazil’s cereal exporters
association, ANEC (Associação Nacional dos Exportadores de Cereais), to declare a
moratorium on purchases of soy originating from areas deforested in the “Amazon
biome” after July 24, 2006 (ABIOVE [Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil
Industries], 2006). All monitoring reports since the moratorium was established show
convincingly that only minuscule percentages of lands deforested after 2006 contain
soy operations.
This chapter considers the major steps required for the moratorium to have
succeeded, steps that a market alone was unlikely to take — steps that required very
strong state-led institutions and information building over decades for the purposes
of making a strong national entity. While we emphasize state-led phenomena, we are
not saying that market-led phenomena were not important. Market-led dynamics were
essential, along with the state-led ones. With a relatively weakened state during this
neo-liberal period, space was opened for the market and for international NGOs to
pull information and economic levers to obtain compliance with moratorium rules. At
the same time, however, the moratorium succeeded because of decades of successive
governments, beginning with that of President Vargas, which built the sense that the
Amazon biome was important to protect; a vast region like this came to be identified
as a territory in need of planning, investment, development, and of monitoring and
surveillance. In addition, the institutions and technology required to enforce the mora-
torium, as will be shown, have their roots in state-led nation building, much less in
market building.
For the moratorium to work, it had to have some type of institutional organization.
Operating first outside of any government agency, and with no official government
involvement whatsoever, the moratorium formed a Soybean Working Group,
comprised of industry/business interests and several international and local NGOs,
including the World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy, The Institute for
Amazonian Research, Conservation International, Greenpeace, and the Amazonia
Defense Front, based in Santarém, Pará, the site of the disputed Cargill port facility
(ABIOVE [Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries], 2006a; ABIOVE
[Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries], 2006b). The Working Group
divided into three subgroups: a farmer education campaign group, a public relations
group designed to build greater international business and NGO support and to begin
developing federal government support, and a group to develop a monitoring strategy
so that the moratorium could be enforced. As evidence of the lack of initial govern-
ment involvement in the moratorium, the federal government did not become an
official participant in the moratorium until June 2008 (ABIOVE [Brazilian Association
of Vegetable Oil Industries], 2008). 
Like any law, the moratorium had to define its territorial focus — what was allowed,
not allowed, and where. The “Amazon biome” was the region chosen as the geo -
graphic target of the moratorium, and for this, the moratorium relied on the distinction
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between the humid tropical forest biome of more equatorial Amazonia and the drier
tropical forest and savanna biomes located to the south (Figure 8.1). Recall that this
distinction was first made and mapped with the military’s Radar Amazon (RADAM)
project of the 1970s, and that President Vargas’s Brazilian Geographic and Statistics
Institute of the 1930s was charged with keeping this information for planning
purposes. Also, the distinction between these two major biomes within the Legal
Amazon was first made in the Forest Code in 2001. A much greater percentage of
forest could be removed on lands identified as a type of savanna than humid forest.
The moratorium, in effect, could rely on these definitions and the fact that a line
dividing the two biomes had already been made decades earlier. With the territorial
focus defined, the Working Group had to determine what areas were deforested within
the Amazon Biome each year and then verifying each year whether soy had been
planted there. For this, the moratorium relied on the National Institute for Space
Research’s annual mapping of deforested areas in the Amazon, and the hiring of a
third-party research firm to fly over the identified deforested areas to look for
soybeans.1 In July 2010 the soy moratorium was renewed for the fourth time, and in
every monitoring report produced since the beginning, only a negligible percent of
area deforested in the Amazon can be attributed to the planting of soybeans. In 2009,
Carlos Minc, then-Minister of the Environment, showed his enthusiasm for the mora-
torium in an announcement that soybean agriculture no longer factored into
deforestation (GLOBALSAT and ABIOVE [Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil
Industries], 2008 and 2009; Leão, 2009; Lovatelli, 2009). 
Conclusions and a Critique of the “Success” of the Soy Moratorium
The preceding paragraphs placed the soy moratorium into its historical context,
providing a much richer understanding of how soybeans came to be “illegal” in the
Amazon. The moratorium, as an attempt to stop deforestation around the production
of a valuable domestic and export commodity, came at a time when a democratized
Brazilian state was bypassed by powerful international agribusiness and environ-
mental non-governmental organizations to force farmers to change their land-use
practices. In order for the moratorium to be a success, it required the institutions of a
strong national state dating back to the 1930s, and the information these institutions
produced and held for government planning. Thus, neither Fearnside’s call for strong
state-led command and control to stop deforestation, nor Nepstad’s faith in global
markets to work in favor of conservation are based on a historical, political-economic
and institutional understanding of Brazil. 
Now considering in more detail the feat that the moratorium achieved, Brazil had
never systematically enforced its forest code since it was first formally written in the
1930s. On the one hand, how could Brazil realistically enforce it? The Amazon basin
itself is of continental size, and even though Brazil had the information it needed to
identify offenders, government officials were loath to make the political and economic
investment needed to enforce it. In fact, from the Vargas Administration through the
military years, forest code enforcement seemed to be merely a lever that federal
government officials could pull at will in order to attack any potential regional land-
holding opponents of the strong national state project. This is the point at which the
neoliberal market has made a major contribution to stopping deforestation. It is a force
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with a reach so wide that it made it possible to enforce an even more stringent rule
than the forest code itself. The moratorium, in effect, made it illegal to do something
that was perfectly legal under Brazilian law. It was legal to plant soybeans on de forested
land, as long as farmers remained in compliance with the forest code and its restric-
tions on total area cleared. It is very unlikely that the federal government ever would
have passed such a restriction on land use. The enforcement appears to have worked,
because farmers received visits by the soy purchasers themselves, signing documents
they would not try to sell soybeans from recently deforested land, and that if caught,
they would lose their only outlet to the market. They would also lose one of the most
important sources of credit for seeds and fertilizers, as the soy purchasers themselves
allowed farmers to borrow on the value of the following year’s production (Brown,
personal communication with government official). Both the purchasers and the
farmers have calculated up to now that it would be too costly not to follow the mora-
torium directives. But again, it is difficult to imagine that a market would have created
the kinds of institutions and information the moratorium required. Instead, the mora-
torium appears to have taken advantage of institutions and information that were first
created to build the Brazilian national state, an entirely different purpose.
With the richer historical understanding of the success of the moratorium, we now
turn to a critique of the so-called “success” of the moratorium. Despite the positive
reports that soy is no longer a factor in deforestation, we do not see the moratorium
as a sustainable long-term solution to deforestation in the Amazon. Much of this chap-
ter’scritique is based on the fact that the moratorium is very commodity- and national
biome-centric. This chapter concludes by considering each of these limitations in turn.
By focusing in on a single commodity, soy, the moratorium makes deforestation out
to be the product of a very simple agricultural activity, masking the complexity of
known cropping practices in Amazonian commercial agriculture. It is known that
soybean is not always the first crop planted after deforesting a plot of land. Upland
rice is often planted as a first crop as a step in the process of preparing the soil for
soybean and other crops (Brown, Koeppe et al., 2005). One explanation for planting
rice first is that rice is harvested higher off the ground, saving harvester equipment
from damage by any remaining pieces of wood and stumps in the field. The success
of the moratorium thus could be simply because farmers normally do not plant soy
anyway on recently deforested land. 
The moratorium thus does not stop deforestation for other crops or activities, and
pasture expansion is one of these. The market for Amazonian beef is rising, as is
demand for cattle hides used in the shoe industry, hence the need for more pasture-
land. In recognition of this, it is not surprising that Greenpeace and others have
spearheaded an effort to develop a moratorium on the purchase of cattle raised on
recently deforested land (Greenpeace International, 2009). It is beyond the scope of
this chapter to provide an evaluation of that effort, but we mention it to make the point
that somewhere along the line, such commodity-centric moratoria, one after the other,
run the risk of becoming old and stale, leading to apathy among consumers and a sense
among agricultural interests that there could eventually be a return to business-as-
usual without fear of any consumer or market backlash. The need to govern the
agricultural system as a whole, involving the complex relationships between land
clearing, livestock and crop production, is required for long-term sustainability of
land-use rules and laws. 
Furthermore, the moratorium can be critiqued for its national, biome-centric
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approach. It makes concerns about global commodity production and environmental
degradation out to be something that is particularly Brazilian and found only in Brazil’s
humid tropical biome. We wonder what effect the moratorium has had on the move-
ment of today’s globalized agricultural operations. It is possible that the moratorium
has simply “squeezed” operations to nearby Bolivia or south to Paraguay (Kaimowitz
and Smith, 2001). Natural vegetation is being cleared, potentially for soy production,
in these countries that do not have the kinds of institutions and information required
for a similar moratorium to be put in place. Moreover, by focusing on humid tropical
forests, it further constructs dry forests and the vast savannas of South America to be
sacrifice zones in the battle to achieve some balance between development and
environ mental conservation (Brannstrom, 2009). We recognize that in any law or rule,
a territory must be identified where the rule is in force. The Amazon biome (humid
tropical forest) was chosen for the moratorium, leaving the savanna outside the zone
of protection. While maps show clear divisions between the two biomes, these are ulti-
mately artificial lines. This is because at the borders of major natural vegetation forms
like this are areas of transition, ecotones, or as called in Brazilian vegetation studies,
areas of “ecological tension.” It is unclear in the monitoring methodology published
thus far how farmers who find themselves along this area of transition are treated in the
moratorium. The map used to separate the Amazon biome (humid forest) from
the savanna is drawn at a scale of 1:1.5 million, which leaves a very large area at the
margin where confusion may prevail about whether one is in or outside the enforce-
ment zone. 
All in all, a biome-centric approach is extremely difficult to enforce without some
confusion. This is what we know from our fieldwork in the municipality of Vilhena,
Rondonia, which is an area near the border between savanna and moist tropical forest
(Figure 8.1). Recall that in the Legal Amazon, the Forest Code, currently the Medida
Provisória 2166, distinguishes only between “forest” and “savanna”. Under the
Medida Provisória, only 20 percent of forested properties may be cleared, while 70
percent of savanna areas may be cleared. In order to clear natural vegetation on one’s
property, one must obtain a license, based on a survey that declares what types of vege-
tation are present, and therefore how much land may be cleared, issued by the proper
authority. In theory, on properties with both forest and savanna, licenses would be
granted for clearing proportional to each vegetation type present. The subjectivity of
the process becomes evident in municipalities like Vilhena at the ecotone between
savanna and humid tropical forest. In these areas, clear distinctions between what is
forest and what is savanna are not evident, and perhaps not possible. Within the
ecotone, some areas are clearly savanna, some are clearly forest, and between these
exists an entire spectrum of mixed or transitional types. Given the binary classifica-
tion system under the Forest Code, choosing to classify a transitional area as either
forest or savanna can depend largely on one’s political economic interests and
 motivations.2
In Vilhena, the authority to grant licenses originally lay with the Instituto Brasileiro
do Meio Ambiente (IBAMA), the federal environmental agency. Officials at the
regional IBAMA office in Vilhena tended to classify mixed areas with trees as forest,
thereby maximizing the amount of land under conservation. In the early 2000s,
the authority to grant licenses passed to the state-level environmental agency, the
Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Ambiental (SEDAM), or the Secretariat of Environ -
mental Development. Because the Rondonia state government viewed agricultural
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development in the state as a big economic opportunity, SEDAM officials tended to
classify transitional areas, even ones with tall trees, as savanna, much to the delight of
farmers (Koeppe, 2005: 110–112). Farmers and landowners also informally tend to
identify the vegetation in the region as mostly or all savanna. They do, however, distin-
guish among a variety of types of savanna, including campo aberto, which is essentially
grassland; standard savanna; and cerradão, or “big savanna.” Cerradão comprises most
transitional types and is the most contentious area for classification. Cerradão is char-
acterized by relatively tall but skinny trees and still significant underbrush (Koeppe,
2005: 112). In the end, such confusion may open the door all along the humid
forest/savanna transition zone for farmers, soy purchasers, and government officials
to resolve disputes informally through some form of clientelism. 
To conclude, the soy moratorium in the Brazilian Amazon, and other similar
efforts, are often praised as a sign that globalized markets can have positive conser-
vation outcomes. We should be very careful not to reduce the apparent success of
these initiatives solely to the market, ignoring the geo-political and historical, state-led
dynamics that may have had a major role, as in Brazil, in making them possible in the
first place. If we are not careful, we run the risk of attempting to apply moratorium-
like efforts in areas that are entirely unprepared or unsuitable for anything like the soy
moratorium to function. One thing we must do is shy away from extreme positions
calling only for state-led or market-led intervention. The history of the soy mora torium
shows that it is neither; one could not have achieved results without the other. 
Notes
1 There is clear collaboration between the National Institute for Space Research and the
Brazilian Vegetable Oil Industry Association to develop more sophisticated methods for
detecting soybean cropping in deforested areas, as evidenced in a recent journal publica-
tion (Rudorff et al., 2011). This is an interesting development of the Institute’s geographic
focus of land change research vis-à-vis the Legal Amazon. Normally, the focus has always
been on tracking deforestation within the humid forest biome. The soy moratorium
appears to have created an interest and need to track land-use practices after deforestation
as well. Such a shift has begun to incentivize greater contact and collaboration between the
Institute and Brazil’s federal agriculture research agency, EMBRAPA (Brown, personal
communication with EMBRAPA official).
2 The Medida Provisória has been heavily criticized by environmentalists and farmers alike.
Environmentalists lament that the law is often either unenforced or ignored. Given the
scale of the Amazon and the expansion activities taking place there, the Brazilian federal
government lacks the resources to enforce the law effectively. Federal versus state juris-
diction over enforcement has also been in dispute. In some cases where the law is enforced,
large land owners may simply deforest however much they like, pay the requisite fine, and
view it as a mere business expense (Koeppe, 2005). Many farmers, on the other hand, find
the law too restrictive and suggest that conservation should not be carried out on a prop-
erty-level basis.
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